Inexplicit knowledge: what people know, but won’t tell
Introduction
Much of the knowledge that exists in organisations remains unarticulated, in the heads of those who work at the coalface of business activities. Knowledge management professionals know this well, and use the terms explicit and tacit knowledge to distinguish between knowledge that can and can’t be communicated via language. Incidentally, the term tacit knowledge was coined by Michael Polanyi – and it is important to note that he used it in a sense that is very different from what it has come to mean in knowledge management. However, that’s a topic for another post. In the present post I look at a related issue that is common in organisations: the fact that much of what people know can be made explicit, but isn’t. Since the discipline of knowledge management is in dire need of more jargon, I call this inexplicit knowledge. To borrow a phrase from Polanyi, inexplicit knowledge is what people know, but won’t tell. Below, I discuss reasons why potentially explicit knowledge remains inexplicit and what can be done about it.
Why inexplicit knowledge is common
Most people would have encountered work situations in which they chose “not to tell” – remaining silent instead of sharing knowledge that would have been helpful. Common reasons for such behaviour include:
- Fear of loss of ownership of the idea: People are attached to their ideas. One reason for not volunteering their ideas is the worry that someone else in the organisation (a peer or manager) might “steal” the idea. Sometimes such behaviour is institutionalised in the form of an “innovation committee” that solicits ideas, offering monetary incentives for those that are deemed the best (more on incentives below). Like most committee-based solutions, this one is a dud. A better option may be to put in place mechanisms to ensure that those who conceive and volunteer ideas are encouraged to see them through to fruition.
- Fear of loss of face and/or fear of reprisals: In organisational cultures that are competitive, people may fear that their ideas will be ridiculed or put down by others. Closely related to this is the fear of reprisals from management. This happens often enough, particularly when the idea challenges the status quo or those in positions of authority. One of the key responsibilities of management is to foster an environment in which people feel psychologically safe to volunteer ideas, however controversial or threatening the ideas may be.
- Lack of incentives: Some people may be willing to part with their ideas, but only at a price. To address this, organisations may offer extrinsic rewards (i.e. material items such as money, gift vouchers etc) for worthwhile ideas. Interestingly, research has shown that non-monetary extrinsic rewards (meals, gifts etc.) are more effective than monetary ones. This makes sense – financial rewards are more easily forgotten; people are more likely to remember a meal at a top-flight restaurant than a 500$ cheque. That said, it is important to note that extrinsic rewards can also lead to unintended side effects. For example, financial incentives based on quantity of contributions might lead to a glut of low-quality contributions. See the next point for a discussion of another side effect of extrinsic rewards.
- Wrong incentives: As I have discussed at length in my post on motivation in knowledge management projects, people will contribute their hard earned knowledge only if they are truly engaged in their work. Such people are intrinsically motivated (i.e. internally motivated, independent of material rewards); their satisfaction comes from their work (yes, such people do exist!). Consequently they need little or no supervision. Intrinsic rewards are invariably non-material and they cannot be controlled by management. A surprising fact is that, intrinsically motivated people can actually be turned off – even offended – by material rewards.
Psychological safety and incentives are important factors, but there is an even more important issue: the relationships between people who make up the workgroup.
Knowledge sharing and the theory of cooperative action
The work of Elinor Ostrom on collective (or cooperative) action is relevant here because knowledge sharing is a form of cooperation. According to the theory of cooperative action, there are three core relationships that promote cooperation in groups: trust, reciprocity and reputation. Below I take a look at each of these in the context of knowledge sharing:
Trust: In the end, whether we choose to share what we know is largely a matter of trust: if we believe that others will respond positively – be it through acknowledgement or encouragement via tangible or intangible rewards – then the chances are that we will tell what we know. On the other hand, if the response is likely to be negative, we may prefer to remain silent.
Reciprocity: This refers to strategies that are based on treating people in the way we believe they would treat us. We are more likely to share what we know with others if we have reason to believe that they would be just as open with us.
Reputation: This refers to the views we have about the individuals we work with. Although such views may be developed by direct observation of peoples’ behaviours, they are also greatly influenced by opinions of others. The relevance of reputation is that we are more likely to be open with people who have a good reputation.
According to Ostrom, these core relationships can be enhanced by face-to-face communication and organisational rules/ norms that promote openness. See my post on Ostrom’s work and its relevance to project management for more on this.
Summing up
One of the key challenges that organisations face is to get people working together in a cooperative manner. Among other things this includes getting people to share their knowledge; to “tell what they know.” Unfortunately, much of this potentially explicit knowledge remains inexplicit, locked away in peoples’ heads, because there is no incentive to share or, even worse, there are factors that actively discourage people from sharing what they know. These issues can be tackled by offering employees the right incentives and creating the right environment. As important as incentives are, the latter is the more important factor: the key to unlocking inexplicit knowledge lies in creating an environment of trust and openness.
Six common pitfalls in project risk analysis
The discussion of risk in presented in most textbooks and project management courses follows the well-trodden path of risk identification, analysis, response planning and monitoring (see the PMBOK guide, for example). All good stuff, no doubt. However, much of the guidance offered is at a very high level. Among other things, there is little practical advice on what not to do. In this post I address this issue by outlining some of the common pitfalls in project risk analysis.
1. Reliance on subjective judgement: People see things differently: one person’s risk may even be another person’s opportunity. For example, using a new technology in a project can be seen as a risk (when focusing on the increased chance of failure) or opportunity (when focusing on the opportunities afforded by being an early adopter). This is a somewhat extreme example, but the fact remains that individual perceptions influence the way risks are evaluated. Another problem with subjective judgement is that it is subject to cognitive biases – errors in perception. Many high profile project failures can be attributed to such biases: see my post on cognitive bias and project failure for more on this. Given these points, potential risks should be discussed from different perspectives with the aim of reaching a common understanding of what they are and how they should be dealt with.
2. Using inappropriate historical data: Purveyors of risk analysis tools and methodologies exhort project managers to determine probabilities using relevant historical data. The word relevant is important: it emphasises that the data used to calculate probabilities (or distributions) should be from situations that are similar to the one at hand. Consider, for example, the probability of a particular risk – say, that a particular developer will not be able to deliver a module by a specified date. One might have historical data for the developer, but the question remains as to which data points should be used. Clearly, only those data points that are from projects that are similar to the one at hand should be used. But how is similarity defined? Although this is not an easy question to answer, it is critical as far as the relevance of the estimate is concerned. See my post on the reference class problem for more on this point.
3. Focusing on numerical measures exclusively: There is a widespread perception that quantitative measures of risk are better than qualitative ones. However, even where reliable and relevant data is available, the measures still need to based on sound methodologies. Unfortunately, ad-hoc techniques abound in risk analysis: see my posts on Cox’s risk matrix theorem and limitations of risk scoring methods for more on these. Risk metrics based on such techniques can be misleading. As Glen Alleman points out in this comment, in many situations qualitative measures may be more appropriate and accurate than quantitative ones.
4. Ignoring known risks: It is surprising how often known risks are ignored. The reasons for this have to do with politics and mismanagement. I won’t dwell on this as I have dealt with it at length in an earlier post.
5. Overlooking the fact that risks are distributions, not point values: Risks are inherently uncertain, and any uncertain quantity is represented by a range of values, (each with an associated probability) rather than a single number (see this post for more on this point). Because of the scarcity or unreliability of historical data, distributions are often assumed a priori: that is, analysts will assume that the risk distribution has a particular form (say, normal or lognormal) and then evaluate distribution parameters using historical data. Further, analysts often choose simple distributions that that are easy to work with mathematically. These distributions often do not reflect reality. For example, they may be vulnerable to “black swan” occurences because they do not account for outliers.
6. Failing to update risks in real time: Risks are rarely static – they evolve in time, influenced by circumstances and events both in and outside the project. For example, the acquisition of a key vendor by a mega-corporation is likely to affect the delivery of that module you are waiting on –and quite likely in an adverse way. Such a change in risk is obvious; there may be many that aren’t. Consequently, project managers need to reevaluate and update risks periodically. To be fair, this is a point that most textbooks make – but it is advice that is not followed as often as it should be.
This brings me to the end of my (subjective) list of risk analysis pitfalls. Regular readers of this blog will have noticed that some of the points made in this post are similar to the ones I made in my post on estimation errors. This is no surprise: risk analysis and project estimation are activities that deal with an uncertain future, so it is to be expected that they have common problems and pitfalls. One could generalize this point: any activity that involves gazing into a murky crystal ball will be plagued by similar problems.
Planning, improvisation and the passage of time
Introduction
In an earlier post inspired by this paper, I discussed how planning and improvisation are contrasting yet complementary aspects of organizational work. One of the key differences between the two activities lies in how time is perceived by those involved in performing them: in the planning world time is considered to be a resource that can be measured and apportioned out to achieve desired aims whereas improvisation takes place “outside of time”; it occurs instantaneously and (often) without any prior intimation. In this post I discuss these two contrasting views of time in greater detail and then look into some of their implications, both from the perspective of organizations and individuals who work in them.
The “planning view” of time
Organisational activities and events (like all human endeavours) are marked and measured by the flow of time. It is fair to say that concern for time – specifically, the way it is used – is one of the main preoccupations of those who run organisations. As Ciborra puts it:
Concern for time in any business organization is not new, nor rare. Think of concepts such as just in time or time based competition. In modern management, time is looked at as a fundamental business performance variable, even more important than money. Concepts such as lead time or time to market portray time as the cutting edge of competitive advantage.
In other words, time is viewed as a quantity that can be apportioned and allocated – budgeted – much like money. This obsession with planning and controlling time is what leads businesses to implement procedures and processes intended to reduce unpredictability and improve business efficiency. Improvisation is seen as undesirable because of its inherently unpredictable nature.
Planning anticipates future events and moves that will be made in response to them. However, they can only be based on what is known and foreseen at the time of formulation. Plans are thus based on a mix of past experience and anticipation of what the future might look like. Moreover, because an action cannot occur until all dependent prior actions are completed successfully, they implicitly assume that all planned actions will be completed. As Ciborra puts it:
Procedural planning anticipates moves and events as if already occurred and just translated on the other side of the “now”. That is, procedural planning arranges in front of the actor the past (actions thought of as accomplished and embedded into plans), so that in performing an action he/she can encounter “in the now” mileposts which prompt the actor to do the next move…
So, as paradoxical as it sounds, in the planning view, planned actions are seen as already accomplished in the future. In other words, plans assume that events and actions will evolve in an entirely predictable manner. Note that although uncertainties may be factored in through risk analysis and the development of alternate scenarios, even these are treated as alternate branches of known futures.
The “improvisation view” of time
Improvisation is generally preceded by an “instantaneous” flash of insight in which apparently unconnected experiences and knowledge are brought to bear on the situation at hand. The process is inherently unpredictable: one does not know when a flash of insight that precipitates an improvised action will occur. Since improvisation occurs on the spur of the moment, what is important is the cutting edge of time, the instant of action. In this sense, improvisation lies “outside of time.” However, this does not mean that the past does not matter. On the contrary, improvisers draw upon past experiences, possibly even more than planners do. However, they do so in ways that they are not consciously aware of before the moment of action. As Ciborra tells us:
Improvisation is extemporaneous because it does not belong to an orderly distillation, formalization and transfer of past experience into future mileposts. Indeed, when encountering the future improvisation relies on the past, but it deploys it by retrieving (quickly according to ordinary time) domains of experience in a moment of vision during which vast regions of experience are brought to bear on the situation at hand, as interpreted at that very moment
Instead of attempting to envision what a future situation might look like and plan responses to it, improvisation interprets and reacts to “future” situations as they occur. So, although the improviser draws upon the past, he or she is firmly focused on the present in which actions are formulated and carried out. In such situations, the improviser (who works outside of the plan) perceives time differently from others (who work by a plan) – more on this in a moment.
Implications for organisations
Let’s take a brief look at a couple of implications of the different conceptions of time outlined above.
First, because improvisation cannot be foreseen, it cannot be placed on an objective timeline prior to the event. Those who make elaborate, detailed plans aimed at encouraging creativity (which generally involves improvisation) in their organisations will, more often than not, be disappointed. Any creative activity that occurs will be despite the plan, not because of it.
Second, since it is impossible to know how the future will unfold, planners should accept (and welcome!) that there will always be an element of improvisation to even the most carefully planned activity. As a result of this, there will always be an irreducible element of uncertainty associated with any planned activity.
Third, it is important to keep in mind that although both planning and improvisation depend on the past, there is an important difference in the way the past is viewed in the two cases. As Ciborra states:
The two temporalities of routine (planned activity) and improvisation are characterized by the fact that in both the unfolding of the future “sucks in” the past, but they do so in distinct ways. In procedural planning, one meets the future by relying on “frozen”, predigested bits of the past, lumps of experience that have been made explicit. During improvisation it is our being in the situation that comes to the fore. The past, in terms of who we are and how we read the world is recollected on the fly, in response to the situation at hand.
The implication here is that plans are (largely) based on, explicit knowledge whereas improvisation draws on both explicit and tacit knowledge. This is another reason why improvised solutions cannot be (explicitly) articulated before the fact.
The passage of time
The two conceptions of time are subjective in the sense that they describe how the flow of time is perceived by the person carrying out the planned or improvised act. In his book, The Labyrinth of Time, the philosopher Michael Lockwood mentions the example of the basketball player Michael Jordan, who once said that when maneuvering through a bunch of defenders (an improvised act), time seemed to slow down for him (though clearly not for the spectators and bemused defenders). Based on this, Lockwood suggests that:
…our impression of the flow of time, as it elapses, reflects the rate at which consciousness is being stimulated. It is counted out in a cerebral counterpart of the “baud rate”, instead of units of (objective) time, per se.
Based Lockwood’s idea, I suggest that since improvisers are more engaged with what they are doing (than those who perform planned acts) they operate at a higher mental “baud rate” than normal. Hence their actions and perceptions will seem quick – even instantaneous – to others who operate at a normal mental “baud rate.” When people are truly engaged in an activity, time thus appears to slow down. However, clock time (or objective time) ticks on at its usual rate. So, when the improviser is done, he or she is often surprised at how much clock time has elapsed. In contrast, a person not fully engaged in an activity has an “eye on the clock”, so to speak. Such a person’s perception of the passage of time would be pretty much in synch with objective time.
Summary and wrap-up
Improvisation and planning are based on two very different conceptions of time. Planning views the future in terms of a sequence of activities that have a clear relationship to each other. Specifically, any point in the future is seen as a milestone that serves to flag what comes next. Further, despite all contingency plans, the assumption is that the future will indeed unfold in one of the ways envisioned. Improvisation, on the other hand, views the future as open and “up for grabs”. There is no conscious sequencing of activities; improvisers just do what feels right at the time. Although improvisers may anticipate events as consequences of their actions, there are no predefined milestones that mark out the flow of time. Since organisational work consists of a mix of planned and improvised activities, the upshot of the above is that time cannot be entirely planned out.
To end on a metaphorical note: if one compares the flow of time to that of a river or stream, then “planning time” is a river flowing through a well defined channel whereas “improvisation time” is more like a rain-fed freshet gushing down any which way it can, carving out new channels in the bargain.
Eight to Late 